Recent literature has argued that, contrary to the results of a seminal paper by Rose (2004), WTO membership does promote bilateral trade, at least for developed economies and if membership includes non-formal compliance. We review the literature in order to identify open issues. We then develop the simplest possible "corner-solutions" version of the gravity model which serves as a framework to readdress these issues. We focus on the extensive margin of trade that separates positive-trade from zero-trade country pairs. We argue that the model can be consistently estimated using Poisson pseudomaximum-likelihood methods with exporter and importer fixed effects. We account for coding issues and the potential heterogeneity of the WTO membership which recent contributions have stressed. While we find that WTO membership increases the likelihood that a given country pair trades, we do not find that the extensive margin has a strong and systematic effect on the average trade-creating potential of the WTO.
Introduction
Any country becoming a member of the WTO is expected to honor its guiding principles.
These are: a) Most-favored nation treatment, b) national treatment of foreign goods, services and intellectual property rights, c) multilateral negotiations on reciprocal reductions of trade barriers, d) fair competition rules related to dumping and subsidies, including a mechanism of dispute settlement, and e) preferential treatment of developing countries. 1 Judging from the degree of compliance, member countries in many instances appear to question the national advantage of adhering to these principles. Membership often seems to come at the cost of foregoing preferred policies, or having to yield concessions with unwelcome effects. Yet, overall these principles should lead to a transparent and predictable world trading environment that features open markets, thus enhancing world efficiency. 2 Therefore, WTO membership is commonly regarded as a key vehicle to enhance the growth and development perspectives of less developed countries.
In 1947, there were 23 founding signatories of the GATT. Presently, as many as 153 countries are members of the WTO. Moreover, the GATT/WTO was remarkably successful in reducing the level of trade barriers through 8 successive rounds of multilateral negotiations.
On average, the import tariffs applied by GATT/WTO members have fallen to levels that are a mere quarter of what they were after the Second World War. 3 There was thus a widening as with a real GDP growth of 3.8 percent. 4 The GATT/WTO almost routinely receives credit as a causal factor for this increase in world trade.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, when Rose (2004a) set out to quantify the trade-enhancing role of WTO membership in an econometric study of world trade based on the gravity equation, he ended up concluding that "we currently do not have strong empirical evidence that the GATT/WTO has systematically played a strong role in encouraging trade". In a companion paper, Rose (2004b) has studied the trade policies pursued, to arrive at the conclusion that WTO member countries also do not follow more liberal trade policies than non-members.
These papers have questioned the conventional view of the GATT/WTO as a significant trade-promoting institution.
However, subsequent literature has readdressed the issue, adding specific pieces of revisionist evidence. Thus, Subramanian & Wei (2007) This paper revisits the issue by looking at a place of potential evidence that has so far received relatively scant attention. By restricting his sample to country pairs where trade is strictly positive, Rose (2004a) has ignored the possibility that WTO membership may be important for whether or not two countries trade with each other at all. This is the so called extensive margin of world trade, as opposed to the intensive margin relating to how existing trading relationships evolve through larger or smaller quantities traded. Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) present detailed evidence on the relative importance of these two margins, concluding that the postwar increase of world trade took place through both, larger quantities traded (the intensive margin) and an increase in the number of country pairs that engage in trade (extensive margin). The question then is whether WTO membership comes out as a stronger trade promoting force if movements at the extensive margin of trade are adequately taken into account. Evidence pointing in this direction is presented in Liu (2007) , as well as in Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2008) . In this paper, we present evidence that sheds new 4 See again the most recent WTO World Trade Report 2007. 5 See also Rose (2006) for a comprehensive reply to the literature subsequent to Rose (2004a The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we first discuss the present state of the literature. In section 3, we present a simple theoretical model of the gravity equation that incorporates zero trade as an equilibrium outcome determined among other things by GATT/WTO membership. In section 4, we discuss our data base for econometric estimation, including some preliminary descriptive exploration that guides our estimation strategy. Section 5 takes a Probit-look at the extensive margin of trade, while section 6 presents results from a comprehensive estimation of the nonlinear gravity model. Section 7 will summarize and draw conclusions from our findings.
State of the literature
Given the aforementioned consensus view of the GATT/WTO, it is not surprising that Rose's (2004a) finding has caught a great deal of attention. It seems to cast doubt on the GATT/WTO as a "success story" that exemplifies the virtues of multilateral trade liberalization. But perhaps one should not be too surprised. It is well known that the GATT/WTO was only partly successful in delivering trade policies toward freer trade. There were sectoral exemptions, most notably in agriculture and textiles, and there were country exemptions as well. For instance, up until 1995 developing countries were facing little demand for liberalization when they became members. Moreover, member countries have partly undone negotiated tariff cuts by introducing non-tariff barriers. They have also made extensive use -sometimes abusively -of anti-dumping and safeguard provisions, as well as the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, with disruptive effects on trade.
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In a companion paper, Rose (2004b) has substantiated this concern by examining whether GATT/WTO member countries have systematically followed more liberal trade policies than non-members. His conclusion is that "there is little evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO has actually liberalized trade policy". Hence, the lack of a significant and robust trade effect demonstrated in Rose (2004a) may simply reflect the lack of a liberalizing trade policy effect of the WTO. But this explanation is not entirely convincing, since it is obvious from the above characterization that WTO membership involves more than what is observable in terms of its members' trade policies. At any rate, such an explanation would still leave us with a troubling verdict on the GATT/WTO, whose primary mandate is to foster more liberal trade policies.
Several contributions have questioned that such a verdict is justified. For instance, Subramanian & Wei (2007) argue that there is a systematic pattern of asymmetry in this nexus of WTO membership and trade policies. They conduct a Rose-type empirical analysis, but looking at unidirectional trade (imports) rather than total trade flows between any two country pairs. More importantly, they allow for WTO membership to play a different role for developing and industrial countries. They find a strong positive trade volume effect for the latter, but not for the former. For instance, their preferred specification implies that WTO membership has on average increased industrial countries' bilateral imports by as much as 175 percent, while the estimated coefficients imply a much lower effect for developing countries.
In their view, this reflects a policy asymmetry in that developing countries did not utilize their WTO membership toward trade liberalization, while developed countries typically did.
This asymmetry, in turn, is due to differentiated treatment of these two groups of countries by the GATT/WTO; see above. This view receives empirical support in that Subramanian & Wei (2007) also find larger membership effects after the change to a more demanding stance vis a vis new members that took place in 1995. They also disaggregate along the sectoral dimension, to find positive membership effects for trade in liberalized manufacturing (for all countries) and for trade in non-liberalized manufacturing (for developed countries).
Unsurprisingly, no positive effect was found for textiles, footwear and food. What are we to conclude from this exercise of disaggregation? While the results are certainly revealing, in our view they can hardly be interpreted as unequivocal support of a trade increasing effect of WTO membership. Rather, they provide a gravity-based documentation of the partial failure/success of the GATT/WTO. Allowing all data to speak up in a unified way, Rose's (2004a) finding that there is no robust positive WTO membership effect on trade remains upheld, even after Subramanian & Wei (2007) ; see also Rose (2006) . 6 But a negative verdict on the GATT/WTO is still unjustified according to a further criticism raised by Tomz et al. (2007) . Rose's results might partly be due to the fact that WTO-type MFN treatment was sometimes also granted to non-members. In a similar vein, the attempt to secure WTO accession might have triggered more liberal trade policies ahead of formal membership. In Rose's empirical strategy, either of these two cases militate against a significant trade effect of WTO membership, provided that MFN treatment and pre-accession liberalization did in fact lead to more trade. Tomz et al. (2007) therefore suggest a broader view of WTO membership which includes de facto participation without formal membership. They point out that the WTO explicitly provides for such participation by member countries' colonies, as well through provisional membership status during a country's accession negotiation. Redoing Rose's analysis with extended WTO coding of the data (including non-membership participation), they find positive trade effects that are significant, both statistically and economically. For instance, the difference between bilateral trade volumes of non-member participants of the WTO and non-participants is 140 percent. These "revisionist" results make the GATT/WTO appear in a more favorable light than was the case in 6 unobserved multilateral trade resistance. 7 Their empirical study demonstrates that in much of the earlier literature endogeneity has indeed caused a downward bias in the estimated coefficients for the trade effects of PTAs. In principle, the same could hold true also for the estimated WTO membership effects, although they do not address this in their paper. It is interesting to note that Rose (2004a) did run estimations with country fixed effects, which have consistently generated larger membership effects than those without. However, he still regards these coefficients as small, relative to other effects; see Rose (2006) . 8 Generally, however, true endogeneity seems a less severe problem with WTO membership as such than with PTAs. An upward bias would arise, for instance, if there is some unobserved dyad-specific variable which is both, positively correlated with WTO membership (possibly even in a causal way) and bilateral trade. Baier & Bergstrand (2007) list several examples in this vein for PTAs. Basically, the endogeneity concern arises if certain country pairs are more natural trading partners than others, and are therefore more likely to reach a regional trading arrangement (in addition to trading more), for reasons other than those observed "on the right-hand-side". But this argument seems less convincing for the WTO which is a multilateral, not a regional, trading arrangement. Jointly entering a multilateral agreement like the GATT/WTO seems a somewhat odd response to being natural bilateral trading partners. In a similar vein, the notion that certain countries are more natural trading partners than others for the "whole world" (instead of bilaterally) seems far-fetched. However, even absent endogeneity of WTO membership, heterogeneity along the lines of "natural trading partners" or preferential trading arrangements might still involve de facto correlations, such that ignoring PTAs as an explanatory variable for bilateral trade will lead to an omitted variables bias. A priori, an upward bias seems more likely than a downward bias. The initial studies by Rose (2004a Rose ( ,2005 ) did include PTA-regressors, but still failed to deliver a robust WTO membership effect on trade.
From a broader perspective, the WTO status is but one element of the trading arrangement that governs bilateral trade. Adding PTAs and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), one obtains a rich pattern of possible arrangements. Some authors have argued in favor of a mutually exclusive coding of trading arrangements. This means classifying trading arrangements in such a way that any country pair belongs to one and only one arrange- 7 The notion of multilateral trade resistance was introduced into the gravity approach by Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) . Their estimation involves nonlinear constraints. Importer-and exporter-country fixed effects, are an easier way to control for multilateral resistance. Subramanian & Wei (2007) This leads to what thus seems to be the ultimate line of defense for the WTO, which is at the core of this paper. Rose (2004a) (2003), although it is partial equilibrium in that it does not incorporate a resource constraint, with an exogenous mass of firms. There is multiple selection of existing firms into potential export markets. The model is geared toward estimation of a generalized gravity approach including the two extensive margins, using a two-step estimation procedure a la Heckman (1979) .
For the purpose of this paper and for many other applications, a much simpler model without firm heterogeneity suffices to motivate the empirical strategy. On the demand side, we assume Dixit-Stiglitz-type preferences, identical for all countries, with a constant elasticity of substitution σ > 1 between different varieties of goods. Preferences are fully symmetric across all potential varieties, independent on the country of origin. Using p ij to denote the c.i.f.-price in country j for a variety arriving from country i, demand for this variety may be written as D ji = A j p ij −σ , where A j := Y j P j σ−1 . In this expression, Y j is equal to country j's GDP, and P j is the exact price index (unit-expenditure function), depending on prices of all varieties shipped to market j. 15 There are C + 1 countries, and we use i to indicate a country of production. Each firm produces its own variety, using a well defined efficiency unit of a bundle of inputs, with associated minimum unit-cost c i , which is specific to the country where a firm is located.
Variation in c i will be explained below by varying factor endowments and/or varying overall productivity across countries. Unlike Helpman et al. (2008), we assume that all firms have the same productivity in terms of both marginal and fixed cost. We use a to denote the constant marginal input requirement, while f denotes the fixed cost of production, all in terms of efficiency units of the input bundle.
Serving a foreign market entails two types of cost. One is variable trade costs, assumed to be of the iceberg-type and captured by a parameter τ ij > 1, where i and j indicate the sending and receiving country, respectively. In addition, there is a fixed cost f ij that each firm located in country i has to bear when entering an export market j. 16 Fixed costs are in terms of the input bundle with minimum unit cost c i . Domestic sales do not require any of these costs, whence τ ii = 1 and f ii = 0. Variable and fixed trade cost are defined to include both, natural as well as policy-induced factors of trade resistance.
Profit maximization by a representative firm located in country i, assuming any P j to be given, implies a markup price equal to
where ρ := (σ − 1)/σ from the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The price for domestic sales is equal to c i /ρ. A typical firm locating in country i will perceive maximum profits to be earned on exports to country j equal to
Obviously, the firm will choose to export to country j only if π ij ≥ 0. This condition may be rewritten as
We can now envisage all potential trading partners of country i as being ranked, such that f ij (τ ij ) σ−1 /A j falls monotonically, as j = i increases from 1 up to C. Note that this ranking is specific to the exporting country i. Then, there will be a marginal country j i , such that for all countries j ≤ j i condition (3) is satisfied, while for all countries j > j i it is violated.
15 GDP replaces the level of expenditure, assuming balanced trade. 16 The model bears some resemblance to Schmidt & Yu (2001) who introduce firm heterogeneity in fixed costs of exporting into a single export market.
This is the extensive country margin of exports for country i, determined independently for each export market. We introduce an integer-valued function
to indicate that country i's extensive margin of trading partners j i depends on its entire pattern of iceberg-and fixed trade resistance, which appear in vector forms τ i and f i in equation (4) . We use J i to denote the index set of all j ≤ j i . Thus, country i will have positive exports only to countries j ∈ J i . Notice that even if trade costs are symmetric in both directions, trade flows may be unidirectional, since c i is country specific, and the trade resistance terms need not be symmetric in terms of direction. It should be noticed that the key "relative price" determining profitability of bilateral exports is (c i τ ij a)/P j , in addition to the size of the market relative to fixed cost, Y j /f ij .
We now introduce a latent variable ρ σ−1 A j (c i τ ij ) 1−σ , which is the potential value of exports to country j per firm located in country i. The actual per firm value of exports from i to j then is
This is the "corner-solutions" formulation of bilateral exports, where c i f ij /(1 − ρ) is a threshold value for the latent variable ρ σ−1 (c i aτ ij ) 1−σ A j that determines zero "corner-solutions" of bilateral exports to all countries j > j i (or, equivalently, j / ∈ J i ). Aggregate bilateral exports are X ij = N i p ij x ij , evaluated at c.i.f. prices. 17 We now introduce two aggregate measures of the export markets served by a firm located in country i:
The variable Θ i the "aggregate size" of foreign markets reached by a representative firm of country i, relative to country i's domestic market, using A j to measure market size, and In what follows domestic sales are indicated by p i0 x i0 . The variable ̥ i is a simple measure of the entire fixed costs of exporting incurred by each firm in country i, again measured in 17 In this paper, we use the term "corner solutions" model for any model that involves zero trade as an equilibrium outcome of the same mechanisms that also determine the volume of trade. Any such model involves a non-linear relationship between trade (allowing for zeros) and the covariates. Wooldridge (2002) uses the term "corner solutions" to describe Tobit estimation techniques to incorporate the nonlinearity. In out empirical analysis, we rely on a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator; see below.
13 efficiency units of the input bundle with a per unit cost equal to c i . Both of these measures are determined by the extensive country margin of exports which is determined as described above. For given trade costs, both Θ i and ̥ i are increasing in j i (τ i , f i ).
It is important to make a distinction between the impact of infra-marginal trade liberalization which operates through τ ij and f ij for j ∈ J i with a given j i , and the impact of trade liberalization at the margin, which increases j i through either a reduction in τ ij or f ij for some j > j i . However, we first continue describing the equilibrium for a given j i .
Profits on actual exports from
Moreover, denoting domestic sales by a representative country-i-firm by x i0 , market clearing,
. Assuming free entry, we may then invoke a zero profit condition of the form
This determines the level of domestic sales per firm in a familiar way, except for the appearance of two measures of the extensive country margin of exports, ̥ i and Θ i . Total output and sales per firm are determined solely by market potential and fixed costs,
We now close the model by introducing endowments and factor market clearing. Using the scalar V i to denote country i's endowment with the input bundle (in efficiency units), the equilibrium number of firms emerges from the full employment condition which is written as
In view of (7), this simplifies to
Thus, the equilibrium number of firms is unaffected by Θ i , but it falls with an increase in Finally, factor prices are determined such that the cost-minimizing input levels per efficiency unit of the input bundle add up to the country's endowment for each of the factors present. More specifically, assume that c(w) is a dual characterization of the technology, common to all countries, according to which K different factors may be combined to generate an efficiency unit of the input bundle required in the variable and fixed cost of production and trade, with w denoting the vector of factor prices. 18 Then, e i c k (w i ) gives the cost-minimizing physical quantity of factor k used to generate an efficiency unit of the input bundle according to country i's (Ricardian) level of technology, captured by the efficiency parameter e i . Factor market equilibrium in country i then requires
for all k = 1 . .
from (8), we have
Note that the denominator in the first line is equal to 1 + Θ i . Remembering that emerges, if we recognize that the importing country's true price index P j in the numerator of (11) has c.i.f. prices p ij related to the respective home prices p i0 , now holding j fixed and varying the country of origin i. This leads to a second type of extensive margin where exporting countries select themselves into exporters and non-exporters for any importing country j. We may indicate this margin through an index set I j whereby i ∈ I j iff j ∈ J i .
We do not want to impose a symmetry assumption that would allow us to derive the full Anderson & van Wincoop system. The general idea of our approach is easy enough to see from (11) above. The essential points are as follows. First, the "gravity term" on the righthand side of (11) is a latent variable which is strictly positive for all country pairs. However, firms in country i expect negative profits to be earned on exports to any country j / ∈ J i , due to fixed costs f ij , and observed exports X ij will, therefore, be zero. These are the "cornersolutions". Note that by assumption firm decisions are made taking all aggregate variables, i.e., all price indices and multilateral resistance terms (involving extensive country margins 18 The model actually does not depend on the assumption of a uniform technology; we could allow for country-specific minimum cost function c i (w). j i ), as given. The number of firms in each exporting country is endogenously determined through (9).
The second point to observe relates to the WTO membership effect on trade. There is a direct trade promoting effect at the intensive margin through a lower τ ij , if countries i and j ∈ J i are both members of the WTO. According to (11) , these countries should have more bilateral trade than country pairs that are otherwise similar, but where both are outside the WTO or only one is a member. There is a perfectly analogous effect at the extensive margin, making positive trade for member country pair a more likely event than for a non-member pair. This may operate through lower τ ij or lower f ij in the denominator of (11) . Notice that f ij plays no role for the intensive margin effects of WTO membership, but may be important for extensive margin effects.
In addition, there are indirect ("third-country") effects that operate through the multilateral resistance channel. Suppose, for instance, that two countries i and j ∈ J i are both members of the WTO, and there is a third country k / ∈ J i with no exports from i to k. Now suppose that k joins the WTO and through lower τ ik and or lower f ik it jumps the extensive export margin of country i, i.e., k moves into J i in the upper limit of the summation in (11).
Bilateral trade resistance between i and j, relative to these two countries' multilateral resistance has increased, assuming that τ ij as such remains unchanged. As a result, exports from i to j fall through an extensive margin effect of country k's WTO accession. The same effect will not be observed for non-member country pairs, but will be observed also if j is not in the WTO. Any study that looks only at the intensive margin and ignores the extensive margin multilateral resistance effect will thus underestimate the trade effect of WTO membership. 20 Intuitively, what we have here is something like a trade diversion effect that comes about through the resource constraint of the exporting country. Newly established trade between i and k draws away resources from exports to existing trading partners.
An empirical model
Our ultimate goal is to empirically quantify the effect of WTO membership. Our emphasis lies on an appropriate treatment of the extensive margin of trade, based on our corner solutions model of the gravity model developed above. While that model does highlight the possibility of zero trade between certain country pairs, it does not yet offer a workable estimation equation. A key feature of the "corner-solutions" gravity equation is that it is non-linear. 20 We have seen in the preceding section that allowing for multilateral resistance through fixed effects has indeed tended to increase the estimated membership effect.
A possible estimation approach to such an equation is to rely on Tobit techniques, as in Felbermayr & Kohler (2006) . This paper uses a different approach, recently suggested by Santos & Tenreyro (2006) , that has a number of advantages over the Tobit approach.
According to this approach, the empirical model based on equation (11) is as follows.
Recognizing that X ij can be zero, we follow Santos and Tenreyro (2006) and write equation (11) as an exponential model
where
A j (τ ij ) 1−σ and K j := ln Y j P j σ−1 . Note that i and Typically, researchers add a multiplicative error term ε ij to (12), take logs and substitute dummy variable vectors ν i and ν j for K i and K j , respectively. This yields the familiar loglog gravity equation ln X ij = α ln τ ij + β j ν j + β i ν i + ln ε ij , where α := 1 − σ is interpreted as the trade-cost elasticity of bilateral exports and β i and β j are vectors of parameters associated with the exporter and importer country dummies introduced to control for K i and K j , respectively. In a typical empirical gravity equation (e.g., Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003) , real trade costs τ ij are specified as some multiplicative function of policy-induced trade barriers and a host of geographic variables
where (1−CAT ji ) is a row vector of ones minus relevant categorical variables (with associated coefficients in γ) affecting real trade costs τ ij , in addition to distance DIST ij and ad valorem tariffs t ij . Notice that, as usual, coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities.
The problem with this procedure, as pointed out by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) , is that unless the variance of ε ij is independent on the variables Z ij := τ ij , ν i , ν j , the expectation of ln ε ij will depend on these same regressors, leading to inconsistent OLS estimates. Moreover, taking logs generates "missing values" if for some country pairs bilateral trade is zero, as in the "corners solutions" above. This, in turn, may bias estimates, since the data may no longer be viewed as randomly sampled. 21 Santos & Tenreyro (2006) suggest an approach that avoids these problems. Given that the log of a stochastic variable also depends on its variance, the estimation should be guided by the assumed relationship between E X ji |Z ij and V X ji |Z ij , where Z ij denotes the entire vector of explanatory variables. For want of a more specific information on this relationship a reasonable hypothesis might be that conditional variance of M ji is proportional to its conditional mean, i.e. E X ji |Z ij ∝ V X ji |Z ij . Santos and Tenreyro show that (12) can then be estimated by solving the following set of first order conditions
where r indexes bilateral import relationships (ji). In this estimation criterion, Z r denotes an H × 1-dimensional vector of covariate observations (with element z r h ), andβ denotes the corresponding vector of of parameter estimates. This estimator is equivalent to the The key contributions to the literature on the trade effects of GATT/WTO membership mostly use OLS on pooled cross-sections. However, as emphasized above, the "cornersolutions" gravity model that allows for zero trade pairs is necessarily non-linear. Hence, the PPML approach suggested by Santos & Tenreyro (2006) is a much better way to estimate this model. The concerns raised in the recent literature surveyed in section 3 above can also be addressed using this approach. Indeed, this is the key contribution of the present paper. 21 Tobit and Heckman-type procedures can deal with the corner-solutions nature of equation (11); they are, however, not robust to misspecification of the error term. 
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Before turning to our estimation results, we briefly describe the estimation strategy that we believe is appropriate for our data set. We start with a brief description of the data. The data exhibit considerable discrete jumps in the share of missing observations, due to decolonialization or due to the break-up of countries, such as the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
However, as a general trend, the share of active trading relationships has increased strongly over time, both measured in terms of total potential relationships and non-missing ones. 1950  1951  1952  1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 active zero missings compliance with GATT rules through either formal or informal participation) is significantly related to higher trade, while participation defined as formal membership does not. 24 In the subsequent econometric analysis, we want to see whether this distinction continues to matter when the analysis covers the extensive margin of trade and a theory-consistent estimation 23 Indeed, comparing the raw data from COMTRADE with the DoTS reveals that the latter often has zeros and missings where the COMTRADE has small values (e.g., 1,000,000 dollar). Table 1 .
Other covariates: Our control variables are identical to those typically used in the literature; the data are from Rose (2004a) . It includes dummies for joint membership in a regional trade agreement or a strict currency union and a dummy for whether the importer grants GSP (generalized system of preferences) status to the exporter. These variables may vary over time and represent trade policy controls. The model also includes geographical or cultural variables, such as geographical distance, contiguity, the existence of a common language, and a host of dummies reflecting the colonial relationship between an importer and the exporter. Rose's (2004a) estimation relies on data that covers the period 1948-1999. 25 We use the classification of countries by formal and informal membership status, respectively, as provided on the website of Michael Tomz. We have updated our data to the year 2004 using information about WTO membership and regional trade agreements provided on the website of the WTO.
Econometric strategy: Our strategy differs from existing literature in several respects. We have argued above that a close inspection of the data leads us to question the reliability of time series variation at the extensive margin of trade. We therefore propose an econometric strategy that relies on cross section variation rather than a panel framework. In that sense, our results are best viewed as complementary to Liu's. Our strategy has the further advantage that it allows us to trace the behavior of the WTO effect over time. It also avoids having to deal with the fact that over time new countries have been created through decolonialization and the break-up of the Soviet Union. 27 We proceed in two steps. First, we look at the extensive margin in isolation, employing a cross-section Probit estimation framework for the aforementioned sub-periods representing characteristic episodes in the history of the GATT/WTO. In doing so, we also explore the differential role of formal vs. informal membership, as well as the difference between de- (2006) call the "gold medal mistake" by consistently using importer-and exporter fixed effects to control for unobserved variables. 28 Moreover, our specification is theory-grounded in the sense that we use bilateral imports, rather than total trade (exports plus imports) as our dependent variable. This also increases the number of observations for each period; see Table 1 for details. 29 6 Estimation results All coefficients are to be read as marginal effects (evaluated at sample averages). Robust standard errors in parentheses (corrected for clustering at countrypair level), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. trading relationships are becoming more and more far-reaching geographically. This is an interesting result that has not been noted before. It contrasts with the "distance-puzzle" found in intensive-margin-models surveyed in Disdier & Head (2008) , by which distance plays an increasingly important role in restricting trade. 30 Also, the trade-creating effect of colonial variables is weakening over time.
Industrial versus developing importers. Odd-numbered columns report the marginal effect on bilateral trade of the importer and the exporter both being formal members of the WTO. In the pre-Kennedy-round period, formal membership has had a fairly strong positive 30 On the extensive margin, see Felbermayr & Kohler (2006 This is a large effect compared to other determinants of the probability of positive trade, such as the existence of a common language, which increases this likelihood by a mere 6 percent. On the other hand, granting easier market access to industrial countries through the generalized system of preferences (GSP) does not affect the likelihood of trade. The same is true if the importer WTO member is a developing country.
In the aftermath of the Kennedy-round, developing importers also see some effect of GATT membership (formal or informal) on the extensive margin, but the impact is much smaller than for industrialized countries (equality of coefficients is rejected at the 1 percent level). However, in the period between the conclusion of the Tokyo and the Uruguay rounds positive effects appear restricted to non-formal membership. Formal membership alone has no significant effect either for industrial or developing countries. After 1995, the extensive margin effect of formal membership seems to have become operative again for developing countries, although its quantitative importance is rather subdued. Overall, Table 2 tells that to some extent the conclusions drawn by Subramanian & Wei (2007) for the intensive margin carry over to the extensive margin. However, there is a reversal over time: Subsequent to the Uruguay-round, developing countries tend to benefit more than industrial countries.
Formal versus factual membership. Even-numbered columns in Table 2 Robustness checks. Figure 1 plots WTO coefficients obtained by running regressions of the type discussed in Table 3 Table 3 .
We should, however, bear in mind that the amount of trade creation at the extensive margin is over the entire evolution of world trade after formation of the GATT has been Average effects: OLS versus PPML: Table 3 Running PPML on the same sample (i.e., excluding zero-trade observations), the distance coefficient is much smaller, the dummy for colonial ties is less frequently significant, and the regional trade agreement dummy comes with comparable size. As to WTO/GATT membership, the results are somewhat bleaker than those from OLS estimation. Indeed, during the first two time-spans considered, GATT membership seems associated with lower bilateral trade. This effect is quantitatively substantial and roughly constant over the two periods.
In the Tokyo-to Uruguay-round era, WTO membership simply does not seem to matter.
It is only in post-Uruguay-round times that abiding by rules of the WTO appears to boost bilateral trade. The effect is statistically significant and economically important. On average, the volume of trade is twice as large for WTO members than for outsiders. The role of the extensive margin: Columns labeled (C) include zero-trade observations, in the GATT/WTO. The sign of our coefficient estimates is consistently negative for the first three time spans considered and turn positive only in the post-Uruguay-round era. Concentrating on formal membership, we find that developing importers were not "penalized" by GATT membership in the pre-Kennedy-round era, while industrial importers were. In the Tokyo-to Uruguay-round period, this pattern reverses, while both types of countries seem to lose in the Kennedy-to Tokyo-round period. Turning to the period after the Uruguay agreement, we find strongly positive effects comparable in size to some of the estimates of Subramanian & Wei (2007) . However, it turns out that developing countries benefit more strongly from WTO membership than industrialized countries. The difference in the coefficients is statistically significant and amounts to a differential trade creation of about 100 percent (e 1.343 − e 1.035 ). 
Conclusion
World trade has evolved over the past five decades at both, the intensive and extensive margin. Our estimation strategy duly responds to the issues raised in recent literature. Thus, we account for multilateral resistance, and we differentiate between country-groups (developing and industrial countries), as well as between formal membership as opposed to factual participation in the GATT/WTO. Moreover, responding to concerns about the reliability of trade data at the extensive margin, we abstain from panel estimation and rely on cross sectional evidence instead, averaging our data for the important phases of GATT/WTO history.
What is the conclusion that we may draw from our empirical exercise? First, we do find some evidence for WTO membership to raise the odds that countries trade with each other at all, but the effect is by no means robust across country groups and time. Nor Grossly speaking, the same result obtains if we differentiate between types of membership and country groups.
The broad conclusion, then, is that the extensive margin does not prove a powerful line of defense for WTO membership as a trade-promoting force in a model which otherwise seems to work fine in terms of explanatory power, as well as the magnitude and significance of coefficient estimates.
